Abstract: The first part of this paper presents two efficient cryptographic protocols, based on quantum entanglement, for secure exchange of secret keys. While the first protocol requires storage of entangled qubits, the second protocol has no storage requirements and presents a probabilistic model. We show that there is a tradeoff between security against eavesdropping and the efficiency of the protocol in terms of usable bits available for the secret key. This security parameter s can be varied by the communicating parties based on practical considerations. In the second part of the paper, we apply the probabilistic model to BB84 and show how it can be used to improve the efficiency of BB84.
Introduction
The conventional approach to cryptography has been one that of encryption and decryption. While classical systems allow for several public key cryptography schemes based on mathematical assumptions it also allows for perfect secrecy using one-time-pads (Shannon, 1949) . However, one-timepads are impractical in classical communications because they require an independent, random and uniform, key as long as the message itself and that this key be kept secret and provided to receiver with perfect secrecy. As a result, unless the sender and the receiver have met in-person beforehand and exchanged a key for future use or use a trusted third party system, one-timepads are impossible to implement for everyday requirements for secure communication over a network.
A work around for this has been to use stream ciphers. Stream ciphers use a pseudo-random generator (Parakh, 2006) to expand a relatively small key into a long stream of random looking numbers that simulate a one-time-pad. However, since these random numbers are produced from a small key (seed provided to the pseudo-random number generator) they only provide computational secrecy.
Quantum key distribution protocols on the other hand make the one-time-pad encryption practical by providing a method for exchanging the one-time-pad keys over a public channel with perfect secrecy. As a result, parties that have never met before can initiate a perfectly secure transaction by first using quantum key distribution protocol to exchange the one-timepad key and then using classical one-time-pad encryption for the actual transfer of messages.
The secrecy in quantum key distribution systems is derived from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the fact that an unknown qubit cannot be copied (Wootters and Zurek, 1982) . The first quantum key distribution scheme was proposed in Bennett and Brassard (1984) . A number of variations on the protocol have since then been published (Bennett et al., 1992; Ekert, 1991; Scarani et al., 2004; Parakh, 2013 Parakh, , 2015 Mandal and Parakh, 2015) . Central to all the previous protocols are random measurements at transmitting and/or receiving ends that helps in detecting any eavesdropping. However, these random measurements also reduce the number of usable bits for encryption key thereby reducing their efficiency.
In this paper we present two new protocols for quantum key exchange, based on quantum entanglement. The first protocol improves the efficiency (over previously proposed protocols) of key exchange by eliminating random measurement of qubits. However, this requires Alice and Bob to store the qubits until the time of key exchange. The second proposed protocol can be implemented with current technology and does not require storage of entangled qubits. Although it uses random measurements, the improvement in efficiency comes from the probabilistic nature of random measurements, i.e., not all the qubits are measured in random basis. We show that by making only random measurements on a subset of qubits more usable bits for the secret key can be derived. The number, s, of qubits in this subset can be viewed as the security parameter that can be varied providing a tradeoff between efficiency and security.
In the latter part of the paper we extend the idea of probabilistic measurements to BB84 and present two protocols for it. These protocols show that there are different ways to apply a probabilistic approach to BB84 but not all of them have the same efficiency.
A protocol by Lo et al. (2005a) uses probabilistic measurements to improve efficiency of BB84. However, their protocol is different from the one presented because they only alter the probabilities with which rectilinear and diagonal bases are chosen rather than choose a subset of qubits on which random measurements are done.
Quantum communications
Quantum systems use quantum bits (analogous to classical bits) that may be manifested as photons for the purpose of communication over fibre optics or free space optics. Different polarisations of the photons can then be used to represent 1 and 0. Further, orthogonal angles of polarisation can be used as a basis -for example, 0 and 90 degrees are orthogonal to each other and form the rectilinear basis. Similarly, 45 degrees and -45 degrees (or 135 degrees) form an orthogonal pair and called the diagonal basis.
As a result, if Alice and Bob agree to use rectilinear basis of measurement, then a qubit polarised at 0 degrees denotes a classical bit 0 and a qubit polarised at 90 degrees denotes classical bit 1. Correspondingly, in the diagonal basis a qubit polarised at 45 degrees denotes a 0 and a qubit polarised at 135 degrees denotes a 1.
In general, however, a qubit can be thought of as a superposition of the two orthogonal states |0⟩ and |1⟩ and written as α|0⟩ + β|1⟩, where α and β are complex numbers and denote the probability amplitudes of |0⟩ and |1⟩. This implies that, with probability of |α| 2 the qubit collapses to state |0⟩ and with probability of |β| 2 it collapses to state |1⟩. In general, |0⟩ denotes bit 0 and |1⟩ denotes bit 1 in rectilinear basis.
Therefore, by convention, in diagonal basis a qubit polarised at 45 degrees and denoting bit 0 can be written as |+⟩ =
|0⟩+|1⟩
√ 2 and a qubit polarised at 135 degrees (or -45 degrees) denoting bit 1 can be written as |−⟩ = |0⟩−|1⟩ √ 2 . Further measurements in the wrong basis leads to a random collapse. From the above discussion, a qubit in diagonal basis when measured in rectilinear basis collapses to bit 0 or 1 with probability one-half. Similarly, a qubit in rectilinear basis when measured in diagonal basis collapses to bit 0 or 1 with probability one-half.
In the following section we briefly describe the two major protocols for quantum key distribution -the BB84 protocol and the E91 protocol. BB84 protocol does not use entangled photons whereas E91 does. However, both the protocols use one-time-pad for encryption, have been shown to be equivalent and suffer from a low information transfer rates, i.e., many more qubits have to be sent to the receiver than actual number of key bits that need to be securely transferred.
The BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol uses qubits aligned in two different bases -the rectilinear and the diagonal basis. It provides a secure method to exchange a one-time-pad key over a public channel. Implementations of BB84 protocol have appeared in practice. For example, MagiQ, IDQuantique and SmartQuantum (Moore, 2007) are some of companies that build products that implement BB84.
The BB84 protocol proceeds as follows:
1 Alice generates two random streams of bits:
2 Alice then transmits photons to Bob according to following rules:
• if a i = 0 and k i = 0, transmit a photon polarised at 0 degrees
• if a i = 1 and k i = 0, transmit a photon polarised at 45 degrees
• if a i = 0 and k i = 1, transmit a photon polarised at 90 degrees
• if a i = 1 and k i = 1, transmit a photon polarised at 135 degrees.
In other words, when a i = 0 Alice chooses rectilinear basis for transmission and when a i = 1 Alice chooses diagonal basis for transmission. • if b i = 0, measure the ith qubit received from Alice in rectilinear basis
• if b i = 1, measure the ith qubit received from Alice in diagonal basis.
4 Denote the resulting bit stream at Bob's end as As the result of Eve's random measurements, there will be additional errors introduced on Bob's end. Now, Alice and Bob knowing each other's matching bases and having discarded the qubit not received in matching bases will publicly announce a subset of results received in the matching bases (i.e., where a i = b i ). In the absence of Eve, Alice and Bob would expect to see a perfect match in results. However, owing to Eve's random measurements, Bob will see errors in his results.
Assume that Alice sends 1024 qubits to Bob. When Bob randomly chooses his bases for measurement, it is expected that 50% of the bases will match that of Alice's. As a result, Bob expects to receive the exact value that Alice sent for 512 of the qubits. And the remaining qubits will suffer a random collapse. Now, if Alice and Bob publicly compare the values of say a third (about 170) of the qubits received by Bob in the matching bases, then the probability that Eve will measure any given qubit in the wrong basis is 1 2 and that the qubit will collapse to an incorrect value is 1 2 . As a result, for any given qubit that is compared the probability that Eve will be detected is 1 4 . Therefore, the probability that Eve will go undetected for any given (compared) qubit is 3 4 and that Eve will be detected in 170 comparisons is given by 1 − ( 
Efficiency of BB84
Alice's goal is to send enough qubits so that in the end Bob is left with at least n-bits that can be used as the one-time-pad key. Further, the protocol requires Alice and Bob to publicly compare the values of t qubits. It is recommended that t be at least a third of total qubits that are received correctly. Therefore, the desired number of qubits that Bob should receive correctly are n + t = n + n 2 = 1.5n. Now because of random measurements done by Bob, it is expected that only 50% of the qubits will be received correctly. As a result, Alice would have to send at least N = 2(n + n 2 ) qubits to Bob. Further, since 50% is only an expected value, to account for variance Alice will send an additional ∆ qubits making the total N = 2(n + n 2 ) + ∆. Therefore, the efficiency of BB84 can be given as follows,
Ignoring ∆ << n in the above equation, we get,
Therefore, inherently, BB84 only has an expected efficiency of about 33%.
Entanglement based key exchange
The E91 protocol uses EPR pairs or Bell states for quantum key agreement (Desurvire, 2009; Ekert, 1991) . The assumption is that Alice and Bob share an ensemble of N = 2(n + 
, respectively. Because of the properties of entanglement, if Alice measures her qubit it instantaneously affects the qubit of Bob. As a result, if Alice measures her qubit in diagonal basis, then she will see a random result of 0 or 1 and Bob's qubit will instantaneously collapse to state of |+⟩ or |−⟩, respectively. Now, if Bob happens to measure his corresponding qubit in the same basis as Alice did, i.e., diagonal basis, his result will be the same as Alice's. However, if Bob happens to measure his corresponding qubit in rectilinear basis, then he will see a random collapse of 0 or 1. Similar cases occur when Alice chooses her measurement basis as rectilinear.
At the end of the above measurements, Alice and Bob announce their bit streams A and B, basically informing the other party the choices of bases they made for measurement. They then discard all the bits where
For the remaining qubits, since they were measured in the same bases by both Alice and Bob, they should have the exact same results. Similar to as in BB84, they can now publicly compare the bit values of a randomly chosen subset of these and detect Eve's presence.
Efficiency of E91
The efficiency of E91 protocol is the same as that in BB84, i.e., 33%. This is because, owing to random measurements on Alice and Bob's ends only 50% of these measurements match up. Further, Eve's detection takes place using the same mechanism.
The proposed protocols
In general, quantum key agreement protocol have the following similarity: Measurements in random bases -this is essential to detect eavesdropping since the eavesdropper will not know the random measurement bases and hence introduce errors with a high probability.
The protocols proposed in this paper aim at improving the efficiency of quantum key exchange/distribution. The first protocol achieves this by using entangled qubits and eliminating the need to measure in random basis. However, the drawback of the protocol is that it requires storage of qubits, which may not be possible for longer periods using current technology.
The second protocol, does not require any storage of qubits and makes random measurements as well to detect eavesdropper. However, the number of qubits subject to random measurements can be varied from all the N qubits to s < N qubits. Therefore s acts as a security parameter and the probability of detection of eavesdropping can be controlled to desired level while increasing efficiency.
Proposed protocol 1
Assume that Alice and Bob share pairs of entangled qubits, viz.,
|00⟩+|11⟩
√ 2 , i.e., the first qubit of the entangled pair is with Alice and the second qubit is with Bob. This can be done in a number of ways:
• entangled qubits can be exchanged long before the actual initiation of secure message transfer
• could be generated by a common source on demandlike a qubit distribution centre (QDC)
• Alice could generate entangled qubits and send one of the qubits of the pair to Bob over a public channel.
Note that the entangled qubits themselves do not carry any information. Both the parties store the entangled qubits without making measurements until the time when an encryption key is required. With the above setup, Alice sends n-bit message M = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ) to Bob, securely, in two phases. Assume that they share N = n + s entangled pairs.
Phase 1
Check for eavesdropping: Alice and Bob first check the fidelity of their shared entangled pairs using the following steps:
• Alice randomly chooses s qubits and conveys to Bob her choices
• Alice then randomly measures her s qubits in randomly chosen bases, rectilinear or diagonal
• she then conveys her choice of bases to Bob and Bob measures the corresponding s qubits in the same bases that Alice chose to measure her qubits in
• now Alice and Bob compare their results publicly.
If the entangled qubits have not been interfered with, then the results that Alice and Bob obtain must be the same. If they see any discrepancy in their measurements, that means that Eve has interfered with the entangled qubits. If Eve's presence is not detected, the qubits used to check for Eve's presence are then discarded and the remaining qubits are used to securely transfer a message from Alice and Bob as discussed in Phase 2.
Phase 2
The actual transfer of information occurs during this phase.
• Alice measures the remaining n = N − s of the entangled qubits in diagonal basis resulting in a random stream of bits, denoted by k i
• Alice then sends a classical bit stream c i = m i ⊕ k i
• Bob first measures his half of the qubits in diagonal basis resulting in the same stream k i as Alice
• upon receiving the bit stream c i , Bob retrieves the message bit as follows:
Bob receives the message M at the end of the above protocol because when two entangled qubits are measured in the same basis, the results are identical and hence Alice and Bob end up with the same key k i s.
Security of the proposed protocol
We observe in the protocol that the only place where qubits are actually transmitted is during the distribution of entangled qubits. If a QDC is being assumed, then Eve could 'tap' both the channels from QDC to Alice and Bob and measure the corresponding qubits. This will result in two things:
• Alice and Bob will receive qubits in exactly the same state.
• the qubits will no longer be entangled.
Eve not knowing the choice of s qubits will have to make random measurements. Since s is the number of qubits that Alice and Bob use for detection and they make all the measurements in matching bases (Alice first makes the measurements and tells Bob the bases for measuring his), ideally all of these measurements must agree. If Eve has made any measurements during the qubit distribution process from QDC, then the probability that Eve will get her choice of basis wrong is 1 2 . Further, when Eve gets a basis wrong the probability that Alice and Bob will see disparities in their measurements is also 1 2 . As a result, the probability of Eve's detection for any given qubit is 1 4 and the probability of Eve going undetected, for any given qubit, is 3 4 . Therefore, the probability that Eve will be detected in s comparisons is given by 1 − (
s . The communication of bases of measurement over a public channel does not carry any useful information that might help Eve determine the final encryption key.
Efficiency of the protocol
The efficiency of the above proposed protocol can be computed as follows. If Alice and Bob want to share n bits of encryption key and would like to stick with the rule of using a third of the shared qubits for Eve's detection, then Alice and Bob should start out with sharing n + s = 3n 2 . Since no random measurements are made on the receiving end, none of the qubits are lost owing to mismatch of bases between Alice and Bob.
Therefore, the efficiency of the protocol is given by,
That is a 66.7% efficiency.
Proposed protocol 2
The proposed protocol 1 provides an increase in efficiency as compared to BB84 and E91, however, the limitation of the protocol is that it requires storage of entangled qubits. Although, this is similar to the assumption made in quantum teleportation (Bennett et al., 1993) , we would like a protocol that would work given current technological limitations on storing qubits for longer periods. As a result, the advantage of protocol 2 is that Alice and Bob do not have to store the entangled qubits. The proposed protocol proceeds as follows: chosen s of them in diagonal or rectilinear basis at random and all the remaining in diagonal basis.
At the end of the above transmission and measurement, Alice and Bob have two sets of measurements: s measurements that were made in random bases and N − s measurements that were made in diagonal basis only. To detect for eavesdropping, they do the following:
• Alice and Bob publicly declare their positions of the randomly chosen s qubits. Assume that m of these positions match up
• for these m positions they compare the bases chosen for measurement
• finally, for the bases that match, they publicly compare the resulting bits they have.
Eve will be detected, if there are any discrepancies in bit values compared in the last step.
Probability of detecting Eve
The total number of ways Alice can randomly choose s out of N qubits is . The probability of this happening is given by,
Since m can take any value between 1 and s, the expected number of qubits that will match between Alice and Bob's choices is given by the summation, 
The expected number of common positions is given by the derivation for E(X) given below. Similar to that in BB84 and E91, Eve's measurements will cause errors with a probability of 1 4 for any given qubit. As a result, the probability that Eve will be detected is given by 1 − ( 
Number of usable Qubits and efficiency
While s N · s qubit positions match up between Alice and Bob and will be used to detect for Eve, not all of the remaining qubits that were not in matching positions need to be discarded. This is because, of the remaining s − s N · s qubits on Alice's half, half of them were measured in diagonal basis that match up with Bob's diagonal measurements. Similarly, of the remaining s − s N · s qubits on Bob's end, half of them were measured in diagonal basis that will match up with Alice's measurements and can be used to form the key.
The total number of qubits, r, that are discarded after the process for checking for Eve is computed as follows:
where r is equal to the addition of the fraction of qubits that Alice and Bob selected at matching positions (and used up to detect Eve) and the fraction of qubits that were not found in the matching positions and were measured in rectilinear basis. Therefore, the total number of measured bits that are usable at the end is given by:
The expected efficiency of the protocol is given by:
In the above example, where N = 1024 and s = 341 the expected efficiency of the protocol is given by ρ pp2 =
1024−341 1024
≈ 0.667. About 66.7% efficiency. Given the above result for expected number of matching qubit positions and the probability of detecting Eve, Figure 1 shows the plot between s and the number of matching qubit positions. Figure 2 shows the probability of detecting Eve and the efficiency of the protocol as s is varied. It is clear from Figure 2 that there is a tradeoff between probability of detection and efficiency. However, we can see that as s grows the number of qubits that will be in matching positions also grow. For example, when s = N , all the qubits positions between Alice and Bob match but that leave no usable qubits for actual key exchange. As a result, not all of the qubits in these matching positions may be used to detect Eve.
In fact, when s = N , the proposed protocol may be reduced to E91. 
Comparing security with BB84/E91
In BB84, the expected number of qubits that will be used for detecting Eve is given Further, the efficiency is then given by,
That is 42.4% efficiency, as compared to 33% for BB84 and E91 for the same probability of detecting eavesdropper.
Applying the one-third rule
Although the above calculations show an increase in efficiency, we are comparing fewer than one-third of the qubits to detect Eve. In BB84 and E91 the ratio of number of qubits used for detecting eavesdropper and the qubits that form the final key is 1:2, i.e., if t is the number of qubits used to detect eavesdropping and n is the number of qubits remaining to form the key then t = n 2 . As a result, if we want to apply the one-third rule to protocol 2, we see that we must set,
Solving for s in the above equation, we get s ≈ 0.618N . Going back to our example of N = 1024, we see that s ≈ 632 and That is an efficiency of 38.3%. Further, the number of qubits actually compared is more than the number of qubits compared in BB84 and E91.
When Eve measures only few Qubits
While ideally Eve would like to measure all the qubits being transmitted, she may measure only a fraction of the qubits to avoid detection. If we denote by u the fraction of qubits that Eve interferes with (i.e., measures), then the probability of detection of Eve may decrease. To compute Eve's detection probability, we first need to compute the expected number of qubit positions that will be common between all three parties. From previous sections, we see that if Alice and Bob randomly and independently measure s out of N qubits, they expect to see Further the best strategy for Eve may not be random measurements, but measure all the qubits she chooses in only diagonal basis. This way, if she escapes detection, all her measurements that were not a part of Alice's and Bob's sets A and B give her key bits.
11 Probabilisitc BB84: Protocol 1 BB84 does not use entangled qubits, therefore, to create the analogue of the probabilisitc protocol discussed previously Alice will have to modify the protocol slightly.
The modified BB84 protocol
• Alice generates a stream of N random bits: A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N ), such that s of these are 0s at random locations and the remaining are all 1s. She also generates another N bits long random sequence
• Alice then sends Bob N qubits, in total, made up of N − s qubits in diagonal basis and s qubits according to the rule:
In other words, when a i = 0 Alice chooses rectilinear basis for transmission and when a i = 1 Alice chooses diagonal basis for transmission. Since in bit stream represented by A, we have s bits 0, we send s qubits in rectilinear basis and remaining qubits in diagonal basis.
• Bob generates his own random stream of bits:
such that s of these are 0s at random locations and remaining are all 1 s.
• Bob then measures the qubits he receives from Alice according to the following rule:
• if b i = 0, measure the ith qubit received from Alice in rectilinear basis
• Denote the resulting bit stream at Bob's end as
• Alice and Bob publicly compare bit streams A and B and discard the bits from K and K ′ where a i ̸ = b i .
At the end of the above protocol, the fraction of qubits that will be transmitted and measured in rectilinear basis is given by s · s N . This implies that the number of qubits that were either transmitted in rectilinear but measured in diagonal basis or vice versa is given by 2(s −
qubits that were transmitted in diagonal basis and measured in diagonal basis and hence correctly received. This is plotted in Figure 3 . The one-third rule dictates that the ratio of correctly received qubits to compared qubits must be 2 : 1. Therefore if we set ≈ 351 qubits that will be measured by Alice and Bob in diagonal basis and can be used to form the encryption key.
Efficiency: The efficiency of the above protocol can be calculated as follows, ρ = # of usable qubits Total # of qubits transmitted
For the one-third rule with s =
, the resulting efficiency is 34.33%.
12 An alternate protocol for improving the efficiency of BB84: Protocol 2
In the above section, we notice that for the one third rule, the efficiency of randomised BB84 although higher is not significant. One of the reasons for this is that all the qubits that were not common between Alice and Bob in the rectilinear group of qubits are lost. We can, therefore, get improved efficiency if some of these qubits can be used as well to form the final key. Figure 4 plots this efficiency function. This can be achieved by randomly encoding qubits in rectilinear and diagonal bases. The alternate protocol (with only difference from the previous protocol) is given below:
• Alice generates a stream of bits A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N } such that for s of the bits in random locations she tosses a fair coin and sets that bit to 0 if it lands Heads and 1 if it lands Tails. For N − s remaining bits, she sets all the a i values to 1.
• Transmission takes place as described before.
• Bob during measurement, randomly chooses s of the incoming qubits and measures them randomly in rectilinear or diagonal basis and the remaining N − s qubits he measures in diagonal basis.
Again the number of common qubit locations between Alice and Bob (those that were encoded in random bases and measured in random bases) is given by s 2 N . Out of these common locations, only half of them will be measured in matching bases and is given by N . The result of random measurements is that the half of the qubits that are not in common locations can also be used to form the encryption key. As a result, the total number of usable qubits is given by N − s.
The resulting efficiency is:
Exact same analysis applies to this protocol as that presented for protocol 2 for entangled qubits before. Note that Figure 2 plots this efficiency.
Further discussion on security
The proposed probabilistic protocols only alters the fraction of qubits that are randomly created and measured by Alice and Bob. This fraction is directly proportional to the probability of eavesdropper detection. When the communicating parties decide to prepare and measure all the qubits in random bases the proposed protocol becomes equivalent to BB84. We have provided a theorem on portion of qubits that will match between Alice and Bob if they measure only a fraction of qubits in random bases. The simulation results show how the probability of detection of an eavesdropper varies with this fraction. Further we compared the efficiency of the protocol with that of BB84 for the same probability of eavesdropper detection.
Like BB84, the proposed protocols assumes the following:
• The communicating parties are connected via an authenticated channel. In a public key infrastructure, this is often guaranteed using certification authorities, that act as trusted third party, and digital signatures.
• All actions that an eavesdropper can perform are completely and accurately described by quantum theory.
• The devices used by the communicating parities work as specified by the protocol.
In the last few years, however, BB84 has been shown to be vulnerable to a number of attacks based on non-ideal nature of photon emitters and detectors. In particular, in a blinding attack the eavesdropper takes advantage of the behaviour of avalanche photo detectors by shining bright light at them thus influencing the key Bob receives (Renner, 2013; Lydersen et al., 2010) . Since we assume similar characteristics to BB84 for emitters and detectors, our protocol remains vulnerable to attacks based on hardware issues. Non-ideal emitters can emit multiple photons leading to a photon number splitting attack. To defend against such attacks, a decoy state BB84 scheme has been proposed but results in a significantly lower key generation rates (Lo et al., 2005b) . Similar modifications could be used to strengthen the proposed protocols against photon number splitting attacks.
This has led to a number of device-independent implementations (Mayers and Yao, 1998; Barrett et al., 2005; Acin et al., 2007) . However, most of the deviceindependent implementations rely on checking of Bell's inequality for establishing security. Several theoretical and practical challenges exist in implementing tests for Bell's inequality (Vazirani and Vidick, 2014) .
Key reconciliation and privacy amplification:
Quantum key reconciliation is where Alice and Bob derive a common bit string from a bit string that may contain errors because of channel noise. However, to achieve perfect secrecy they have to perform privacy amplification where a shorter key is derived by repeatedly hashing a bit string. Like BB84, these steps are required in the proposed protocols as well.
Conclusions
In the first part of the paper we explored two protocols for increasing the efficiency of quantum key exchange protocols. Both the proposed protocols use entangled qubits.
The first protocol requires Alice and Bob to store the qubits in entangled state until the time of key exchange, the second protocol does not require such storage. Further, the improvement in efficiency in the first protocol comes from eliminating the need for random measurements.
The second protocol, however, does use random measurements but does not require all the qubits to measured in random bases. That is only a subset of transmitted qubits are measured in random bases while the remaining qubits are measured in pre-agreed basis. The result is a protocol that allows for end users to control the probability of detecting an eavesdropper while increasing the efficiency of the protocol by varying the security parameter s.
In the second part of the paper we extended the idea to BB84 and presented two variation on its implementation. The results show that not all methods provide equal increase in efficiency.
